Global Container Shipping Lines: A Comparative Analysis of FY2024

Executive Summary

The global container shipping industry navigated a year of profound paradox in Fiscal Year 2024. A market bracing for the severe impact of a historic influx of newbuild vessel capacity was unexpectedly rescued by geopolitical turmoil. The crisis in the Red Sea, forcing widespread vessel diversions around the Cape of Good Hope, artificially absorbed a significant portion of global fleet capacity, leading to a sharp and sustained increase in freight rates. This external shock, combined with resilient global trade volumes and tariff-related front-loading, provided carriers with a significant, albeit likely temporary, financial windfall. This report provides a comprehensive, metric-by-metric comparative analysis of the ten leading global container carriers—Maersk Line, MSC, CMA CGM, COSCO Shipping, Evergreen, OOCL, Hapag-Lloyd, ONE (Ocean Network Express), Yang Ming Marine, and HMM—against this volatile backdrop.

Financial performance across the board was exceptionally strong, with most carriers reporting substantial year-over-year growth in revenue and profitability, reversing the downward trend seen in 2023. However, these results mask the underlying structural challenge of overcapacity, a risk that remains potent should geopolitical tensions subside. The analysis reveals deepening strategic divergences among the top players. MSC continues its aggressive pursuit of market dominance through sheer scale, expanding its fleet and orderbook to unprecedented levels. In contrast, Maersk is accelerating its transformation into an integrated logistics provider, a capital-intensive strategy reflected in its more conservative fleet expansion. CMA CGM is pursuing a dual-front strategy, aggressively growing both its shipping and logistics arms.

These strategic shifts are crystallizing in a seismic realignment of carrier alliances set to take effect in 2025. The dissolution of the 2M alliance and the formation of the Gemini Cooperation (Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd) and the Premier Alliance (ONE, HMM, and Yang Ming) will fundamentally reshape competitive dynamics on major trade lanes. This report concludes that while FY2024 provided a period of robust profitability, the industry stands at a critical juncture. The competitive positioning of each carrier entering FY2025 will be defined not by the temporary market conditions of the past year, but by the resilience of their balance sheets, the viability of their long-term strategic bets, and their ability to navigate a future where the fundamental imbalance between vessel supply and cargo demand is poised to reassert itself with significant force.

I. Introduction: A Year of Paradox in Global Shipping

The container shipping market in Fiscal Year 2024 was defined by a stark contradiction: a deluge of new vessel supply met an unexpected and acute, geopolitically induced capacity shortage. This paradox created a market environment fundamentally disconnected from traditional supply-demand fundamentals, rewarding carriers with a second windfall just as the industry was preparing for a deep cyclical downturn. The year's performance cannot be understood without first appreciating these powerful, conflicting forces.

The market entered 2024 under the shadow of a colossal orderbook, with industry analysts forecasting a potential $10 billion loss for the sector as a wave of new ships, ordered during the pandemic-era profit boom, began to hit the water.¹ The global fleet was projected to grow by a staggering 10.1% in 2024, a rate far outstripping any realistic demand growth projections.² This structural oversupply was expected to trigger a severe and prolonged freight rate collapse.

However, this anticipated downturn was preempted by a black swan event. Persistent attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea by Houthi militants, beginning in late 2023, rendered the Suez Canal—the primary artery connecting Asia and Europe—unsafe for most carriers.³ The subsequent decision by nearly all major lines to divert vessels around Africa's Cape of Good Hope fundamentally altered the global shipping network. This rerouting adds over 3,000 nautical miles and at least ten days to a typical Asia-Europe voyage, effectively absorbing a significant percentage of the world's active fleet capacity at any given time.³ According to Clarksons Research, this disruption was the single biggest driver of market conditions, contributing to a 6.2% increase in tonne-mile demand—the largest such growth in 15 years—and a precipitous 67% decline in vessel tonnage transiting the Suez Canal.² The artificial tightening of vessel supply had an immediate and dramatic effect, halting the decline in freight rates and propelling them sharply upwards.⁶

This supply-side shock coincided with surprisingly resilient demand. Global container trade volumes grew by a solid 6.2% in 2024, defying earlier recessionary fears.⁷ This growth was further amplified by strategic inventory management from shippers. Facing the dual threats of renewed supply chain disruption and the prospect of new U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods, many importers engaged in "front-loading," accelerating cargo shipments to build up inventories and avoid future costs and delays.⁹ This confluence of artificially constrained capacity and robust, front-loaded demand created the highly favorable, high-rate environment that defined FY2024.

Against this backdrop, the industry is preparing for its most significant structural change in years: a complete overhaul of the global alliance system effective February 2025. The decade-long 2M Alliance between Maersk and MSC will dissolve. Maersk will partner with Hapag-Lloyd to form the "Gemini Cooperation," a new alliance focused on a hub-and-spoke model designed to deliver industry-leading schedule reliability.¹² The remaining members of THE Alliance—ONE, HMM, and Yang Ming—will regroup to form the "Premier Alliance".¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Ocean Alliance, comprising CMA CGM, COSCO Group (including OOCL), and Evergreen, has extended its partnership to 2032, positioning itself as the most stable and largest vessel-sharing agreement in the market.¹⁵ MSC, the world's largest carrier by capacity, will operate independently, leveraging its immense scale to compete against the newly formed blocs.¹⁵

The strong financial results of FY2024, therefore, do not reflect a healthy, balanced market. Instead, they represent a temporary condition where geopolitical events have masked a severe underlying overcapacity problem. The profitability of the past year is a direct consequence of network inefficiency forced upon the industry by external conflict. This creates an extremely fragile foundation for carrier financials. Any resolution in the Red Sea that allows for a swift return to the Suez Canal would instantly reintroduce the massive latent capacity of the global fleet, potentially triggering the sharp and severe market correction that was widely anticipated at the start of 2024. This context of artificial strength and underlying fragility is essential for interpreting the financial and operational metrics that follow.

II. Financial Performance: A Disruption-Fueled Windfall

The anomalous market conditions of FY2024, characterized by artificially constrained capacity and elevated freight rates, translated directly into robust financial performances for the world's leading container carriers. The industry as a whole rebounded sharply from the normalized, and in some cases loss-making, environment of 2023. This section provides a metric-by-metric comparison of the financial results for the ten leading carriers, highlighting the universal uplift while noting key differences in profitability and cash generation.

A comparative overview of key financial metrics is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: FY2024 Key Financial Metrics Comparison (USD Billions)

Company	Revenue (FY2024)	Revenue (YoY % Change)	Net Profit (FY2024)	Net Profit (YoY % Change)	Free Cash Flow (FY2024)
Maersk Line	$55.48	+8.6%	$6.20	+57.7%	$5.10
MSC	Data Unavailable	Data Unavailable	Data Unavailable	Data Unavailable	Data Unavailable
CMA CGM	$55.50	+18.0%	$5.71	+56.9%	Data Unavailable
COSCO Shipping	$32.80	+33.3%	$6.90	+105.8%	~$9.70 (Operating Cash Flow)
Evergreen Marine	$14.10	+67.5%	$4.30	+291.8%	Data Unavailable
OOCL	$10.70	+28.3%	$2.58	+88.4%	$3.21 (Operating Cash Flow)
Hapag-Lloyd	$20.70	+6.6%	$2.60	-18.5%	$2.60
ONE	$19.23	+32.0%	$4.24	+336.0%	Data Unavailable
Yang Ming Marine	$6.94	+58.4%	$2.00	N/A (vs. loss in 2023)	Data Unavailable
HMM	$8.40	+39.3%	$2.70	+178.4%	Data Unavailable

Note: All currency conversions are based on average exchange rates for the reporting period. MSC is a privately held company and does not publicly disclose detailed financial results. Free Cash Flow is calculated as Cash Flow from Operations minus Capital Expenditures; where unavailable, Operating Cash Flow is noted as a proxy.

A. Revenue

Consolidated revenues saw significant year-over-year growth for nearly all carriers, driven by the combination of higher freight rates and, for many, increased transport volumes.

• Maersk: A.P. Moller - Maersk reported a consolidated revenue of $55.48 billion for FY2024, an 8.6% increase from the $51.07 billion reported in 2023.¹⁶ This growth was distributed across its primary segments, with the core Ocean division revenue rising to $37.39 billion from $33.65 billion the prior year, reflecting the strong rate environment.¹⁶

• MSC: As a privately held entity, Mediterranean Shipping Company does not publish its financial results. The financial reports of publicly listed entities with similar names, such as MSC Industrial Supply Co. or MSC Income Fund, are unrelated to the container shipping line and are not representative of its performance.¹⁷

• CMA CGM: The French group reported a strong 18.0% year-over-year increase in revenue, reaching $55.5 billion in FY2024.¹⁹ Its container shipping activities were the primary driver, with segment revenue growing 16.2% to $36.5 billion.⁶

• COSCO Shipping Holdings: The Chinese state-owned giant announced a 33.3% year-over-year increase in operating revenue, which reached RMB 233.86 billion (approximately $32.8 billion).²² The container shipping business alone accounted for RMB 225.97 billion of this total.²²

• Evergreen Marine Corp.: The Taiwanese carrier reported one of the most substantial revenue surges, with its 2024 turnover climbing 67.5% to TWD 463.4 billion (approximately $14.1 billion).²³

• OOCL: A subsidiary of COSCO Group, Orient Overseas (International) Limited announced a group revenue of $10.70 billion for 2024, a 28.3% increase from the $8.34 billion recorded in 2023.²⁴

• Hapag-Lloyd: The German carrier posted a 6.6% increase in group revenue to $20.7 billion (EUR 19.1 billion).²⁶ This more moderate growth reflects its higher exposure to contract rates, which adjust more slowly to spot market fluctuations.

• ONE (Ocean Network Express): For its fiscal year ending March 31, 2025, the Singapore-based carrier reported revenue of $19.23 billion, a significant 32% increase from the previous year.²⁸

• Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp.: Yang Ming's consolidated revenues grew by 58.4% to reach NTD 222.71 billion (approximately $6.94 billion) for the year.²³

• HMM: The South Korean flagship carrier reported a 39.3% increase in revenue to KRW 11.7 trillion (approximately $8.4 billion).³⁰

B. Net Profit

The surge in revenue, combined with efforts to manage costs amidst inflationary pressures and rerouting expenses, translated into dramatically improved bottom-line results for most carriers.

• Maersk: The group's net profit for 2024 stood at $6.2 billion, a substantial recovery from the prior year and its third-best financial result in history.³² The EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) increased by 65% to $6.5 billion.³³

• MSC: Data unavailable.

• CMA CGM: Net income soared by nearly 60%, reaching $5.71 billion for the full year, up from $3.64 billion in 2023.¹⁹

• COSCO Shipping Holdings: Net profit attributable to shareholders more than doubled, increasing by 105.8% to RMB 49.10 billion (approximately $6.9 billion).²²

• Evergreen Marine Corp.: The company's net income saw a near-threefold increase, surging to TWD 139.45 billion (approximately $4.3 billion) from TWD 35.34 billion in 2023.³⁴

• OOCL: Profit attributable to equity holders for 2024 was $2.58 billion, an 88.4% increase over the $1.37 billion profit in 2023.²⁴

• Hapag-Lloyd: In a notable exception to the trend, Hapag-Lloyd's group profit declined to $2.6 billion from $3.2 billion in the prior year.⁷ The company attributed this decrease primarily to lower net interest income and higher tax expenses, even as its operating profit (EBIT) saw a slight improvement.²⁶

• ONE (Ocean Network Express): ONE reported a net profit of $4.24 billion, a remarkable 336% increase from the $974 million earned in its previous fiscal year.²⁸

• Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp.: The carrier reported a strong net profit after tax of NTD 64.18 billion (approximately $2.0 billion), a significant turnaround from its performance in 2023.²⁹

• HMM: HMM's net profit for 2024 was KRW 3.78 trillion (approximately $2.7 billion), a 178% increase from the previous year.³⁰

C. Free Cash Flow

Free Cash Flow (FCF), a critical measure of financial health representing cash generated from operations after accounting for capital expenditures, was robust for the companies that reported it, reflecting strong operational earnings and disciplined investment.

• Maersk: The group generated a strong Free Cash Flow of $5.1 billion for the full year, supported by a positive working capital development and slightly lower capital expenditures than initially forecast.³²

• MSC: Data unavailable.

• CMA CGM: Specific FCF figures are not publicly disclosed, but the company's annual report highlighted a "robust" balance sheet, suggesting strong cash generation.¹⁹

• COSCO Shipping Holdings: The company reported a powerful net cash inflow from operating activities of RMB 69.31 billion (approximately $9.7 billion), a year-over-year increase of 206.9%.²² A precise FCF figure requires deducting capital expenditures, which are detailed within the full annual report.

• Evergreen Marine Corp.: FCF data is not available in summary reports and requires analysis of the full consolidated statement of cash flows.³⁴

• OOCL: The company reported a strong Operating Cash Flow of $3.21 billion.²⁴ As with its parent company COSCO, a final FCF calculation depends on capex figures from the full financial statements.

• Hapag-Lloyd: The carrier reported a positive Free Cash Flow of EUR 2.4 billion (approximately $2.6 billion) for FY2024. This was achieved despite a dividend payout of EUR 1.6 billion and significant investments of EUR 2.2 billion in its vessel and container fleets.²⁷

• ONE, Yang Ming, and HMM: Detailed Free Cash Flow figures for these carriers are not available in their summary earnings releases and would require a detailed analysis of their full annual reports and statements of cash flows.²⁹

III. Operational Capacity and Fleet Dynamics

A carrier's financial performance is intrinsically linked to its operational scale and fleet strategy. The primary industry benchmark for scale is Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) capacity, which dictates a carrier's ability to serve global trade lanes and command market share. In FY2024, the rankings at the top remained relatively stable, but the strategic divergence in fleet management—particularly the balance between owned and chartered vessels—became more pronounced.

The definitive source for fleet and capacity data is Alphaliner, whose Top 100 ranking provides a daily snapshot of the industry's competitive landscape. The data presented here reflects the state of the global fleet as of late FY2024 and early FY2025.

Table 2: Fleet Capacity & Market Share (as of Q4 2024 / Q1 2025)

Rank	Company	Total TEU Capacity	Global Market Share (%)
1	MSC	6,817,648	20.8%
2	Maersk Line	4,634,421	14.1%
3	CMA CGM	4,046,321	12.3%
4	COSCO Shipping	3,468,475	10.6%
5	Hapag-Lloyd	2,390,542	7.3%
6	ONE	2,102,783	6.4%
7	Evergreen Marine	1,877,371	5.7%
8	HMM	966,794	2.9%
9	ZIM	755,038	2.3%
10	Yang Ming Marine	726,031	2.2%

Source: Alphaliner.³⁷ Note: OOCL is consolidated within the COSCO Group figure. ZIM Integrated Shipping Services is ranked 9th, placing Yang Ming at 10th among the companies under review.

A. TEU Capacity and Global Market Share

The hierarchy of global carriers is dominated by a few mega-carriers, with the top four controlling over half of the world's container shipping capacity.

• MSC: Mediterranean Shipping Company solidified its position as the world's largest carrier, commanding a fleet with a total capacity of over 6.8 million TEU, equivalent to a 20.8% share of the global market.³⁷

• Maersk: The Danish carrier holds the second position with a capacity of over 4.6 million TEU, representing a 14.1% market share.³⁷

• CMA CGM: The French group is the third-largest carrier, with a fleet capacity exceeding 4.0 million TEU and a market share of 12.3%.³⁷

• COSCO Group: Consolidating the fleets of COSCO Shipping and its subsidiary OOCL, the Chinese group operates a capacity of nearly 3.5 million TEU, accounting for 10.6% of the global fleet.³⁷

• Hapag-Lloyd: The German line ranks fifth with a capacity of approximately 2.4 million TEU and a 7.3% market share.³⁷

• ONE: The Japanese carrier alliance operates a fleet with over 2.1 million TEU in capacity, giving it a 6.4% share of the market.³⁷

• Evergreen Marine: The Taiwanese line is seventh, with a capacity of nearly 1.9 million TEU and a 5.7% market share.³⁷

• HMM: The South Korean carrier's capacity stands at just under 1 million TEU, for a 2.9% market share.³⁷

• Yang Ming Marine: Ranking tenth, Yang Ming operates a fleet with a capacity of over 726,000 TEU, representing 2.2% of the global market.³⁷

B. Fleet Size

The total TEU capacity is deployed across fleets ranging from under one hundred to nearly one thousand vessels, reflecting different strategies in vessel size and deployment.

• MSC: Operates the largest fleet with 938 vessels.³⁷

• Maersk: Deploys a fleet of 741 vessels.³⁷

• CMA CGM: Commands a fleet of 692 vessels.³⁷

• COSCO Group: The combined group operates 537 vessels.³⁷

• Hapag-Lloyd: Operates a fleet of 293 vessels.³⁷

• ONE: Its fleet consists of 275 vessels.³⁷

• Evergreen: Deploys 232 vessels.³⁷

• HMM: Operates a smaller, more modern fleet of 89 vessels.³⁷

• Yang Ming: Has a fleet of 101 vessels.³⁷

C. Owned vs. Chartered Fleet Strategy

The composition of a carrier's fleet—specifically the ratio of owned vessels to those chartered from the open market—is a fundamental strategic decision with significant implications for cost structure, operational flexibility, and financial risk. A high reliance on owned assets indicates a long-term commitment to scale and provides cost stability, whereas a charter-heavy strategy offers flexibility but exposes the carrier to market volatility.

Table 3: Fleet Composition Analysis (Owned vs. Chartered Vessels & TEU)

Company	Total Vessels	Owned Vessels	Chartered Vessels	% Chartered (Vessels)	Owned TEU	Chartered TEU	% Chartered (TEU)
MSC	938	670	268	28.6%	4,053,401	2,764,247	40.5%
Maersk	741	343	398	53.7%	2,751,028	1,883,393	40.6%
CMA CGM	692	336	356	51.4%	2,415,793	1,630,528	40.3%
COSCO	537	205	332	61.8%	2,113,542	1,354,933	39.1%
Hapag-Lloyd	293	132	161	55.0%	1,448,786	941,756	39.4%
ONE	275	103	172	62.5%	916,320	1,186,463	56.4%
Evergreen	232	155	77	33.2%	1,272,551	604,820	32.2%
HMM	89	67	22	24.7%	803,312	163,482	16.9%
Yang Ming	101	60	41	40.6%	335,496	390,535	53.8%

Source: Alphaliner.³⁷

The data reveals a critical strategic divergence. Carriers such as ONE and Yang Ming exhibit a significant dependency on the charter market, with 56.4% and 53.8% of their respective TEU capacities sourced from chartered vessels.³⁷ This approach provides operational flexibility and allows for capacity adjustments without the massive capital outlay required for newbuilds. However, it creates a structural vulnerability by exposing them to the highly volatile charter rate market. When freight rates are high, as they were in 2024, the correspondingly high charter costs can be absorbed. In a market downturn, however, these carriers could be locked into expensive, long-term charter agreements while their revenues plummet, leading to a severe margin squeeze. This makes their cost structures inherently less stable and their profitability more sensitive to market fluctuations than their competitors.

In stark contrast, carriers like HMM and Evergreen have pursued an asset-heavy strategy. HMM sources only 16.9% of its TEU capacity from the charter market, while Evergreen stands at 32.2%.³⁷ This reflects a long-term commitment to scale through direct ownership, providing greater cost control and stability. While this strategy is capital-intensive and reduces short-term flexibility, it insulates the carriers from the extreme peaks of the charter market and provides a more predictable cost base during downturns. The strategies of the largest European carriers—MSC, Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd—fall in a middle ground, with each having approximately 40% of their TEU capacity on chartered vessels, balancing the need for a stable owned core with the flexibility of a chartered fleet.³⁷

IV. Fleet Efficiency and Market Metrics

Beyond sheer capacity, the operational efficiency of a carrier's fleet and its ability to maximize revenue from its assets are critical determinants of profitability. This involves maintaining high vessel utilization, securing favorable freight rates relative to the market, and making strategic long-term investments in fuel efficiency and decarbonization to mitigate future regulatory costs.

A. Utilization and Voyage Efficiency

Maintaining high vessel utilization is paramount, especially in a market with high operating and charter costs. In Q4 2024, Maersk reported a strong asset utilization rate of 95%, indicating its network was running close to full capacity despite the disruptions.³² The Red Sea crisis, while increasing voyage lengths and fuel consumption, paradoxically aided utilization for the industry as a whole. By effectively removing capacity, the diversions helped ensure that the vessels remaining in service were well-filled. However, this came at a cost.

Hapag-Lloyd, for example, noted in its annual report that the necessary rerouting of ships led to a disproportionate increase in transport expenses.²⁷ The challenge for carriers in 2024 was less about finding cargo and more about managing the complex logistics and higher costs associated with a fundamentally less efficient global network.

B. Revenue per TEU and Freight Rate Analysis

A carrier's average revenue per TEU is a key performance indicator that reflects its exposure to the high-paying spot market versus the more stable but lower-yielding contract market. Throughout 2024, spot rates surged due to the Red Sea crisis. The Shanghai Containerized Freight Index (SCFI), a key benchmark for spot rates out of China, averaged 2,506 points for the year, a 149% increase from the 2023 average of 1,005 points.³¹

• CMA CGM reported the highest average revenue per TEU among the carriers providing this metric, at $1,549 for the full year.²⁰ This suggests a strong exposure to the booming Transpacific and Asia-Europe spot markets.

• Hapag-Lloyd reported a stable average freight rate of $1,492/TEU, nearly unchanged from the $1,500/TEU it achieved in 2023.²⁶ This stability indicates a heavier reliance on its long-term contract portfolio with major shippers, which insulated it from the lows of 2023 but also capped its upside from the 2024 spot rate surge.

• COSCO's unit income on international routes in the fourth quarter was $1,323/TEU, reflecting the blended average across its various trade lanes.³⁹

The performance of these carriers relative to the sharp increase in market indices like the SCFI and the Drewry World Container Index ⁴⁰ illustrates the different commercial strategies at play. Those with higher spot market exposure, like CMA CGM, were able to capitalize more fully on the disruption-driven rate hikes.

C. Fuel Efficiency and Decarbonization Efforts

The shipping industry is on the cusp of a major regulatory shift, with the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Net-Zero Framework set to be adopted in October 2025 and enter into force in 2027.⁴² This, along with regional regulations like the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS) and FuelEU Maritime initiative, will impose significant costs on carbon emissions and mandate a transition to low-carbon fuels.²⁹ Consequently, carriers' long-term investments in fleet renewal and alternative fuels have become a critical component of their competitive strategy.

A clear strategic divergence has emerged regarding the choice of future fuels.

• Methanol: Maersk has been the most prominent advocate for green methanol, investing heavily in a new generation of methanol-dual-fuel vessels.⁴⁵Hapag-Lloyd is also pursuing this path, having signed a long-term offtake agreement for green methanol and planning to convert existing ships to run on the fuel.²⁷

• Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG): CMA CGM has been the leading proponent of LNG as a transitional fuel, taking delivery of 12 new LNG-fueled vessels in 2024 alone and building a large fleet of "e-methane ready" ships.⁴⁶COSCO and Evergreen have also made significant investments in LNG-dual-fuel newbuilds.³⁴

According to Clarksons Research, the scale of this transition is immense, with 50% of all new vessel tonnage ordered in 2024 being alternative-fuel capable.⁵ Within these orders, LNG has been the dominant choice, accounting for 70% of alternative-fueled tonnage (excluding LNG carriers), while methanol's share has declined.⁴⁷ This represents a multi-billion-dollar bet by each carrier on the future availability and price of their chosen fuel, a decision that will have profound implications for their long-term cost competitiveness.

V. Commercial Strategy and Network Positioning

In an industry characterized by commoditized services, a carrier's commercial strategy—defined by its global network coverage, alliance partnerships, and customer value proposition—is a key differentiator. The year 2024 served as a prelude to a dramatic reshaping of the competitive landscape, with the impending 2025 alliance realignment set to redraw the map of global trade routes.

A. Major Trade Routes and Alliance-Driven Geographical Exposure

Carrier alliances are vessel-sharing agreements that allow members to offer more frequent services across a wider range of ports than they could operate alone. The 2025 restructuring will consolidate the market into three major global alliances, alongside the formidable independent network of MSC.

• Ocean Alliance (CMA CGM, COSCO/OOCL, Evergreen): Having extended its agreement until 2032, the Ocean Alliance is set to become the largest and most stable grouping, representing approximately 29% of the market.¹³ Its network is particularly dominant on the Transpacific trade, where it will offer 23 weekly sailings (15 to the West Coast and 8 to the East Coast), and its Asia-North Europe coverage will be the most extensive in the market.¹⁴

• Gemini Cooperation (Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd): This new alliance, launching in February 2025, represents a strategic pivot towards service quality over sheer network breadth. Representing about 22% of the market, the cooperation will operate a network of 29 mainline services, built around a hub-and-spoke model with highly efficient transshipment hubs.¹² The explicit goal is to achieve over 90% schedule reliability, a direct response to the chronic delays that have plagued the industry.³² This positions Gemini as a premium service provider.

• Premier Alliance (ONE, HMM, Yang Ming): As the successor to THE Alliance following Hapag-Lloyd's departure, this will be the smallest of the three major groupings, with a market share of around 12%.¹³ Its network will remain focused on the major East-West trade lanes, such as the Transpacific and Asia-Europe routes, where its members have historically been strong.¹⁴ Its smaller scale may present a challenge in competing with the comprehensive networks of its larger rivals.

• MSC (Independent): After dissolving the 2M partnership with Maersk, MSC will leverage its unmatched scale to operate as a fully independent global carrier.¹⁵ With the largest fleet and the most extensive service network, MSC's strategy is to offer customers the most direct port-to-port connections without the operational complexities of an alliance structure. It will continue to be the leading carrier to the Mediterranean and will match the Ocean Alliance's coverage to North Europe.¹⁴

B. Customer Base and Vertical Integration

Beyond network strategy, carriers are increasingly differentiating themselves through their corporate structure and the scope of services they offer. A key strategic fault line has emerged between carriers pursuing vertical integration into end-to-end logistics and those doubling down on their core ocean freight business.

• The Integrators (Maersk and CMA CGM): Maersk is the pioneer of the "integrator" strategy, actively investing billions to transform from a shipping line into a comprehensive logistics and supply chain partner. Its 2024 results showed continued growth in its Logistics & Services segment, driven by its air freight and warehousing products.¹⁶ This is a complex and capital-intensive transformation that aims to capture a larger share of the customer's supply chain spending.CMA CGM is pursuing a similar path through its subsidiary CEVA Logistics and its landmark acquisition of Bolloré Logistics, which has positioned it as one of the world's top five logistics operators.⁴⁶

• The "Pure Play Plus" Model (Hapag-Lloyd): In contrast, Hapag-Lloyd is adhering to a strategy it calls "Pure Play Plus".³⁵ This model focuses on strengthening its core liner shipping business while making strategic "plus" investments in adjacent, high-value areas, primarily port terminals. The establishment of its Hanseatic Global Terminals (HGT) division is the centerpiece of this strategy, aiming to gain more control over a critical part of the supply chain without diluting its focus on ocean transport.²⁶

• The Ocean Specialists (MSC, ONE, Evergreen, etc.): The remaining carriers, led by MSC, remain primarily focused on optimizing their ocean transport operations. MSC's investments in its logistics arm (MEDLOG) and terminal division (Terminal Investment Limited) are largely seen as supporting and enhancing the efficiency of its core shipping business rather than a move to become a standalone logistics giant.⁵⁰ Similarly, carriers like ONE, Evergreen, HMM, and Yang Ming remain focused on providing reliable and cost-effective container shipping services, relying on their alliance partnerships to deliver global network coverage.

VI. Cost Structure and Forward-Looking Risk Profile

While FY2024 provided a financial reprieve, the industry's forward-looking risk profile is arguably higher than it has been in years. The temporary shield of geopolitical disruption is concealing a market facing immense structural pressures from overcapacity, rising regulatory costs, and persistent geopolitical uncertainty. A carrier's ability to manage its cost structure and mitigate these risks will be the primary determinant of its success in the coming cycle.

A. Operating Cost Structures

Direct comparisons of operating cost per TEU are difficult as carriers do not uniformly disclose this metric. However, a qualitative assessment can be made based on strategic choices. Carriers with a higher proportion of owned, modern, and fuel-efficient vessels (such as HMM and Evergreen) are likely to have a more stable and potentially lower long-term slot cost base. Conversely, carriers with high exposure to the charter market (such as ONE and Yang Ming) face greater cost volatility.³⁷ Furthermore, the rerouting around Africa has universally increased costs, with higher bunker consumption and longer transit times impacting all carriers, though those with more efficient vessels may have mitigated this impact more effectively.¹⁶

B. Orderbook-to-Fleet Ratio: Gauging Future Capacity Risk

The most significant forward-looking risk is the sheer volume of new vessel capacity scheduled for delivery over the next few years. The orderbook-to-fleet ratio is the clearest indicator of a carrier's exposure to this impending wave of overcapacity. A high ratio signals an aggressive expansion strategy but also a substantial risk if demand falters.

Table 4: Orderbook-to-Fleet Ratio and Future Capacity Exposure

Company	Existing TEU Capacity	Orderbook TEU	Orderbook-to-Fleet Ratio (%)
CMA CGM	4,046,321	1,621,896	40.1%
Evergreen Marine	1,877,371	718,432	38.3%
COSCO Shipping	3,468,475	1,199,176	34.6%
MSC	6,817,648	2,294,539	33.7%
Yang Ming Marine	726,031	230,500	31.7%
ONE	2,102,783	641,982	30.5%
Hapag-Lloyd	2,390,542	375,820	15.7%
Maersk Line	4,634,421	670,100	14.5%
HMM	966,794	51,740	5.4%

Source: Alphaliner.³⁷

The data reveals a stark divide. Carriers like CMA CGM (40.1%), Evergreen (38.3%), and MSC (33.7%) have extraordinarily large orderbooks, signaling a massive bet on continued market growth and a strategy to secure market share with larger, more efficient vessels.³⁷ This aggressive posture carries immense risk. If global trade demand falters as this new capacity is delivered, these carriers will be forced to compete fiercely for cargo, putting extreme downward pressure on freight rates.

At the other end of the spectrum, HMM (5.4%), Maersk (14.5%), and Hapag-Lloyd (15.7%) have adopted a much more conservative approach to fleet expansion.³⁷ This positions them with lower exposure to the overcapacity risk and reflects their strategic priorities: HMM is focused on consolidating its position, while Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are allocating capital towards logistics and terminals, respectively, and focusing on network quality over quantity.

C. Analysis of Key Risks

Beyond the central risk of overcapacity, carriers face a complex array of geopolitical, regulatory, and market challenges.

• Geopolitical Risk: The most immediate risk is a resolution to the Red Sea crisis. A return to the Suez Canal would instantly release the "shadow fleet" of capacity currently absorbed by longer voyages, potentially triggering a rapid rate collapse.³ Broader U.S.-China trade tensions and the imposition of new tariffs also pose a significant threat, with the potential to disrupt major trade lanes and reduce overall cargo volumes.⁹ The International Chamber of Shipping's 2024-2025 Maritime Barometer Report identified political instability as the top risk facing the industry.⁵³

• Regulatory Risk: The push for decarbonization represents a monumental long-term challenge. The implementation of the IMO's global fuel standard and emissions pricing mechanism from 2027, alongside the EU's ETS and FuelEU Maritime regulations, will introduce direct and escalating costs for carbon emissions.⁴² This will necessitate a multi-trillion-dollar investment in new vessels and alternative fuel infrastructure, fundamentally altering the industry's cost structure. Carriers that have made the "right" bets on future fuels (e.g., methanol vs. LNG) and can secure supply will gain a significant competitive advantage.

• Market Risk: The core market risk remains the severe, structural imbalance between vessel supply growth and moderating demand growth. Drewry's 2024/25 forecast highlights the competing forces of record newbuild deliveries against disruptive external factors.⁴⁰ Once the temporary support from geopolitical disruptions fades, the industry could face a prolonged period of depressed freight rates and challenged profitability, testing the financial resilience of every carrier.¹

VII. Comparative Synthesis and Competitive Outlook

The analysis of FY2024 performance and forward-looking metrics reveals a container shipping industry at a strategic crossroads. While a tide of disruption-fueled profits lifted all boats, the underlying strategies and risk profiles of the top ten carriers are diverging significantly. Their competitive positioning entering the turbulent post-2024 era will be determined by the unique strengths and weaknesses forged by these strategic choices.

• MSC: The Unassailable Leviathan: MSC's strategy is one of relentless and overwhelming scale. With a fleet approaching 7 million TEU and an orderbook equivalent to a third of its existing capacity, its dominance is mathematically cemented for the foreseeable future.³⁷ By dissolving the 2M alliance, MSC is making a powerful statement: its own network is now so vast and comprehensive that it can compete with—and in many cases surpass—the combined networks of entire alliances.¹⁵ This independence grants it unmatched operational agility. However, its sheer size also means it has the largest absolute exposure to a market downturn. Managing the utilization of such a colossal fleet in a weak market will be its defining challenge.

• Maersk: The High-Stakes Integrator Gambit: Maersk is playing a different game. Its comparatively modest orderbook-to-fleet ratio of 14.5% is not a sign of weakness but a deliberate reallocation of capital away from pure ocean assets and towards its ambitious goal of becoming an end-to-end logistics integrator.³² The Gemini Cooperation with Hapag-Lloyd is a crucial piece of this puzzle, designed to provide a highly reliable, premium ocean product that can serve as the backbone for its logistics offerings.³⁵ The success of this high-stakes gambit hinges on whether the higher margins and customer loyalty from integrated logistics can ultimately outweigh the profitability of more focused ocean carriers in a volatile market.

• CMA CGM: The Dual-Front Powerhouse: CMA CGM is unique in its aggressive, simultaneous expansion in both shipping and logistics. With a staggering 40.1% orderbook-to-fleet ratio, it is challenging MSC's scale in ocean freight, while its acquisition of Bolloré Logistics makes it a direct rival to Maersk's integrator ambitions.¹⁹ This dual-front strategy is supported by its position within the stable and dominant Ocean Alliance.¹⁴ While this positions CMA CGM to capture growth across the supply chain, it also creates significant financial leverage and execution risk.

• COSCO Group (incl. OOCL): The State-Backed Giant: As a cornerstone of the Ocean Alliance and with a substantial 34.6% orderbook ratio, COSCO's position is one of entrenched strength.³⁷ Its strategy is inextricably linked to China's overarching trade policies, providing a degree of stability and a built-in cargo base. This state backing is a formidable competitive advantage, though it also exposes the carrier to heightened geopolitical risk in an era of escalating trade tensions with the West.

• Hapag-Lloyd: The Quality and Profitability Play: Hapag-Lloyd is consciously opting out of the arms race for scale. Its conservative 15.7% orderbook ratio, coupled with a robust balance sheet and the new Gemini alliance's focus on >90% reliability, signals a clear strategy to compete on quality and profitability rather than size.³⁵ This is a disciplined, lower-risk approach that prioritizes shareholder returns and service excellence, making it well-suited to navigate the anticipated market volatility.

• The Premier Alliance (ONE, HMM, Yang Ming): The Challenger Bloc: This newly formed alliance, the smallest of the three, faces a significant competitive challenge. Its members display divergent risk profiles. ONE and Yang Ming are highly dependent on the volatile charter market, making their cost structures vulnerable.³⁷Yang Ming also has a substantial 31.7% orderbook ratio, adding future capacity pressure. In contrast, HMM has a very low charter dependency and the smallest orderbook ratio among the top ten (5.4%), suggesting a period of consolidation and risk aversion.³⁷ The collective success of the Premier Alliance will depend on its ability to carve out a niche and offer a compelling network against the sheer scale of the Ocean Alliance and the premium service promise of Gemini.

• Evergreen: The Capacity Expansionist: With an orderbook-to-fleet ratio of 38.3% and a strong preference for owned assets, Evergreen is making one of the boldest bets on future market growth.³⁷ This strategy will equip it with one of the most modern and efficient fleets in the industry. However, it also makes Evergreen one of the most exposed carriers to the impending wave of overcapacity. Its ability to weather the potential rate depression that will accompany these new deliveries will be a critical test of its financial resilience.

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